The cost of personalised medicine in oncology is increasing. The varied and contrasting priorities of 19 the pharmaceutical industry, local and national governments, international medical community, and 20 patients need to be reviewed and balanced. In addition to the economic and political standpoints on 21 this issue, the ethical considerations from physicians' viewpoints need to be considered to optimise 22 cancer patients' care. In this paper we discuss the way research and development of these drugs is 23 carried out and reimbursed, and how this needs to change. We describe frameworks assessing the 24 value of these treatments which been developed. Physicians need to develop their knowledge and 25 understanding of these issues, to best meet their dual responsibilities of advocating for their 26 patients and promoting public health. 27 28 The Cost of Cancer 29 Cancer is expensive. Worldwide, the financial cost to an individual has been shown to be 30 significant. In the UK where healthcare is free at the point of delivery, a Macmillan charity 31 report found the cost of a cancer diagnosis resulted in being ~£570 a month poorer i . A 32 diagnosis of cancer in the US increases the chance of bankruptcy by 250% [1]. In addition to 33 expense to the patient, cancer is expensive at every level of local and national health 34 systems, and increasingly so. The changing face of oncology with the development of 35 personalised medicine and associated meaningful improvements in survival and treatment 36 toxicity [2]
pricing describes the pricing of a drug based on assessment of its benefits and risks. 48 The price of drugs 49 In 2000 the average cost of one year of a new systemic anti-cancer therapy (SACT) was less 50 than US$10,000. In 2016 a new medicine for a similar indication could cost in excess of 51 US$100,000 for same duration of treatment. The US Agency for Health Care Research and 52 Quality reported a total spend of $88.7 Billion in 2011 iii and the European Union reported 53 spending €126 Billion in 2009 [4] . The cost of developing a new drug has been estimated at 54 $2.6 Billion in 2014 iv ], representing a remarkable almost three-fold increase in the cost of 55 developing new drugs. However, the price of new cancer drugs has increased ten-fold over 56 approximately the same period, with little evidence that improvements in patient outcomes 57 have kept pace. While these costs are not exclusively due to the use of personalised 58 medicine in oncology, as traditional treatment chemotherapy and radiotherapy still play a 59 significant role, they are responsible for the brunt of it. In addition to the cost of the drug 60 itself, there are also the costs of companion diagnostics, development costs, and relevant 61 associated technology. 62 At the same time as the costs of cancer care are spiralling ever upwards, the growth in total 63 healthcare expenditure in developed countries has continued to outstrip the rate of 64 economic growth, and public sector funding of healthcare is up to 46% of total public 65 expenditure in some countries v . Against this background, the economics of healthcare 66 provision in oncology is no longer an esoteric question of interest to a niche community of 67 academics. To sustain high quality cancer care it is vital to understand the cost drivers in the 68 current management of cancer and identify where the choices we make for the future of 69 cancer care improve value for money. 70 So why are these anti-cancer drugs so expensive? One argument to justify this is that these 71 therapies have demonstrated an improvement in quality and extension of life. Viewed in 72 terms of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), the mean incremental health gain from 73 specialty drugs (personalised therapies defined by the authors as 'large molecule' drugs 74 produced using advanced biotechnology requiring special administration, monitoring and 75 handling) launched between 1999 and 2011 has been valued at 0.25 QALYs compared with 76 0.08 for traditional drugs [5] . Twenty two of these 58 drugs were for cancer. Another factor 77 is that targeted therapies, almost by definition, are suitable for fewer patients than previous 78 systemic therapies. This therefore means the commercial return on R&D investment must 79 be achieved from fewer sales, resulting in upward momentum to prices. 80 Another consideration is the move from small molecule drugs to biotherapies such as 81 monoclonal antibodies. The methods of manufacture for biotherapies are considerably 82 more complex and hence expensive than for conventional therapies, and this is necessarily 83 reflected in their prices. However, Rader and Langar [6] report that the efficiency of the 84 production of biopharmaceuticals improved hugely between 2001 and 2014; the yield 85 increasing from 1 to 2.56 gram/litre. This suggests that the cost of manufacturing should 86 lower drug prices during this period. It has not. The complexity of manufacture also creates 87 a non-IP (Intellectual Property) barrier to market entry, which means that the end of the 88 patent's life does not automatically equate to generic entry and monopoly prices can 89 continue for longer than the patent period. The complexity of manufacture for biologic products, 90 is accepted to be orders of magnitude more complex than conventional small molecule therapies. 91
There is real concern that apparently identical production processes will not produce equivalent 92 products, and this has led to regulators to create new regulatory pathways for biosimilar products -93 the equivalent of generics for biologic products -included the requirement of clinical trial evidence 94 to support a claim of therapeutic equivalence. These regulatory requirements mean that much 95 larger upfront investments are required to compete with biologic products after patent expiry. All 96 other things equal, this makes biosimilars a less attractive investment opportunity than generics for 97 small molecule therapies. It also reduces the pool of companies who have the financial and 98 technical resources required to launch a competitor product. 99
An alternative explanation that has gained increasing credence in the media is that the 100 rising price of drugs reflects what the market will bear, rather than value or costs of R&D. 101 During the early 2000s treatments for rare diseases -referred to as Orphan Drugs -were 102 launched with prices in excess of $100,000/patient/year vi . Whilst this was protested, it was 103 paid. In the context of a market, the decision to pay these extremely high prices was a signal 104 to drug manufacturers that the willingness to pay for health gains was considerably higher 105 than had previously been assumed. As drug manufacturers are commercial organisations 106 with a legal duty to maximise shareholder value, and hence profits, it was entirely 107 predictable that the prices for new drugs would increase in response to the information 108 implicit in the decision to pay premium prices for orphan drugs. 110 Clearly governments have a driving role in allocation of resources. The use of health 111 technology assessment (HTA) to guide these decisions is well-established in the majority of 112 developed countries and is becoming increasingly prevalent in developing countries. public stand, refusing to prescribe Zaltrap, the vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) 123 inhibitor also known as aflibercept, for their patients because it 'has proved to be no better 124 than a similar medicine we already have….while its price -at $11,063' is twice as high" xi . 125 One of these physicians, Peter Bach, subsequently led the development of the 'Drug In the UK, the individual cost and total budget impact of new cancer drugs became so acute 132 that in 2010 a dedicated Cancer Drug Fund (CDF) xv was established. This allowed 133 consideration of funding for drugs not currently appraised or recommended by the National 134 Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE). In 2015, having exceeded its allocated budget, its 135 remit changed, with a view to generate evidence for promising but still unproven new 136 cancer therapies whilst ensuring that the total budget impact did not destabilise the UK Health. Whilst it had many problems, with one analysis finding that the CDF had not 142 delivered meaningful value and may have exposed patients to toxic side effects xvi this 143 mechanism was designed to link the price of new cancer drugs to their effectiveness. It also 144 addressed concerns that too rigid an application to value-based market access will eliminate 145 potentially valuable therapies from the health systems formulary before they have had resources to an individual, other patients whose care is funded by the same budget may not 169 be able to access treatment and therefore have been harmed. By following the principle of 170 beneficence for one patient we may inadvertently go against the principle of non-171 maleficence for another, or potentially many. The opportunity cost needs to be considered. 172 The fourth principle of justice balances some of these concerns, with the premise of 173 ensuring fair and equal treatment for all. To consider the treatment of other hypothetical 174 patients as a clinician when one patient is in the clinic room in front of you is difficult. with the assumption that other patients will be equally advocated by their physicians, and 177 that it will all 'balance out'. However there is significant geographical variation in access to 178 SACT through the CDF in the UK xiii , and on a global scale we know that access to 179 personalised medicine is extremely limited in low and middle income countries and this 180 further worsens the health divide between these economies [9] . Another complicating factor is that physicians are frequently involved in managing 213 healthcare resources or writing regional, national or international guidelines. 214 To be just, these guidelines need to be developed transparently with input from patients, 215 clinicians, and the funding/provider parties. An example of this is NICE xviii in the UK, which 216 includes engagement with all relevant parties at every stage of the appraisal process for 217 specific new strategies, and a formal citizens' council which reviews the underlying moral . Priority should be given to technologies for which there is substantial 263 headroom for improvement in health. By avoiding developing technologies for which there is neither substantial nor valued need, the limited financial resources available for 265 translating precision medicine technologies, can be allocated more appropriately and have a 266 greater impact on future cancer therapies. 267 There is no easy solution to these dilemmas. See Outstanding Questions for a list of the 268 main issues still to tackle. Health economics and its direct relevance to patient care must be 269 included in medical education from an undergraduate level, and continued in postgraduate 270 training. For clinicians to feel they have understanding of these issues this must be a subject 271 discussed at medical conferences with representation by economists and discussion 272 between clinicians, economists and those involved in developing guidelines and allocating 273 resources. 274 For guidelines to be developed ethically regarding the allocation of these resources the 275 concept of accountability for reasonableness is useful, advising that guideline development 276 and assessment for funding is undertaken by a group which includes patients who bear the 277 opportunity cost. The process needs to be fully transparent with a process for appeal. The 278 use of technology widely available such as videoconferencing and/or streaming these 279 discussions live may facilitate this. 280 A structured framework which evaluates candidate technologies from a value perspective 281 can help avoid developing technologies for which there is neither substantial nor valued 282 need. Priority should be given to technologies for which there is substantial headroom for 283 improvement in health -i.e. conditions where the health lost by each affected individual, 284 compared to a full quality adjusted life expectancy, is substantial. Also, conditions 285 associated with expensive costs to health care systems offer an opportunity for technologies that achieve the same or better outcomes at a lower price. In assessing the headroom for a 287 new technology it is important to examine forecasts of which technologies might be on the 288 market at future time points. Careful analysis of clinical trial and patent databases can be 289 used to identify technologies that are ahead in the translational pipeline. This can provide 290 insight into the true headroom for a technology at the start of the translational process. 291 In these complex issues which involve global and local economics, politics, and the media 292 we must retain focus on the core issue -how can we get the right drugs to the right 293 patients? With a joint development of these frameworks we may be able to get a cohesive 294 solution to an expensive problem. In addition to politicians, pharmaceutical industry 295 investors, economists and journalists, physicians have to represent their interests -the 296 patient -in these discussions. How else will we be able to look our patients in the eye and 297 say, "I have the right drug for you"? The fundamental idea behind Value Based Pricing is that the price paid for a new drug (or 304 indeed any health care intervention) should reflect the value that it produces. If a health 305 care payer can be explicit about what is valued and how much it is willing to pay for a given 306 amount of that value, then for any given technology, an assessment of the value produced will lead directly to the price that will be paid. For example, consider a new drug that 308 produces an additional two years of good health compared to current treatment. If we 309 measure years in good health as QALYs and the health care payer is willing to pay up to 310 £30,000 per QALY, then the maximum price for the new drug would be 2 x £30,000 = 311 £60,000 [27] . In reality Value Based Pricing is much more complicated as the value of health 312 gain tends to be affected by other factors such as the age/stage of life of the recipient, the 313 severity of the health problem and even the characteristics of the technology itself [28] . 314 When the UK government attempted to develop a Value Based Pricing framework, based 315 upon consultations with the UK population, they were unable to identify a framework that 316 was acceptable to all stakeholders in the negotiations [29] . As a result, the plans were 317 scrapped and new 5 year PPRS agreement was implemented in its stead. 318 Value Based Pricing is only one of many alternative market access proposals that have been 319 proposed by both policy makers and academics over the last two decades. Whilst these 320 schemes have many different names, they can be considered in three categories: Pay for 
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